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And then two came along at once: Inter-State Cooperation on Core Crimes,  





Despite their fundamental importance in the effective prosecution of international 
crimes, inter-state judicial cooperation regimes have long been overlooked. However, 
two new initiatives have recently emerged. The first is the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity (Draft Articles), which 
aims to create a global convention on prevention, punishment and inter-State 
cooperation with respect to crimes against humanity. The second initiative, the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty for core crimes (MLA Treaty), is wider in scope. It 
encompasses genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and seeks the 
conclusion of a multilateral cooperation treaty to enable the effective provision of 
mutual legal assistance and extradition of suspects in relation to these crimes. The aim 
of this article is to critically assess the merits and shortcomings of these two 
initiatives in the effort to enhance inter-state cooperation in the prosecution of 












Since the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), international hopes and 
expectations for the prosecution of international crimes1 have centred on the ICC. Yet 
it is not possible, either in theory or practice, for the Court to pursue prosecutions in 
all instances. The ICC was established as a Court of last resort, which would step in 
when national courts are unable or unwilling to carry out criminal trials.2 Thus, even 
if it were practically possible, the Court should not be responsible for prosecuting all 
instances of international crimes. Moreover, the ICC Statute is not universally 
ratified, the Court does not have jurisdiction over all cases without Security Council 
referral3 or state agreement,4 and even where it does have potential jurisdiction, the 
Court has limited resources that mean it cannot take on all cases. 5 
 
Recent failures by the Court to illicit from states the necessary assistance for the 
effective prosecution of international crimes has refocused attention on the crucial 
 
1 International crimes are defined here as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as these 
are the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the permanent international criminal court. Arts 6, 7 
and 8, ICC Statute. 
2 Art 17, ICC Statute. See Mohammed El Zeidy, “The Principle of Complementarity: A New Principle 
to Implement International Criminal Law” 23 Michigan Journal of International Law (2001-2002) 
869-955.  
3 Art 13(b) ICC Statute. 
4 Art 12(3) ICC Statute. 
5  International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritization, 15 September 2016, paras. 12 and 49. 
3 
 
role of state cooperation in conducting trials of those responsible.6 Problems at the 
Court, in conjunction with the impunity gap created by regional non-ratification of the 
ICC Statute in the Middle East and Asia,7 the threat of African Union withdrawal,8 
and the lack of referral consensus at the UN Security Council9 have brought fresh 
scrutiny to the role that national courts can play. The notion that the best prospects for 
prosecution lie at national levels is not new. Indeed, the ICC is premised on the 
principle of complementarity,10 which envisages national courts as having primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of international crimes. However, the ICC Statute 
itself only regulates cooperation between states and the Court. 11  It provides no 
horizontal cooperation regime to govern the provision of judicial assistance or 
extradition of suspects between states. 
 
6  For a summary of the cooperation cases at the ICC see Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Legal Rules, Policy 
Choices and Political Realities in the Functioning of the Cooperation Regime of the International 
Criminal Court’, in Olympia Bekou and Daley J. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International 
Criminal Court: Perspectives from Theory and Practice, (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016) pp. 7-57. 
7 A list of states parties can be found on the ICC’s website, www.icc-cpi.int, accessed 17 July 2018. 
8 African Union, Withdrawal Strategy Document, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 12 January 2017); Gino 
Naldi and Konstantinos Magliveras, ‘The International Criminal Court and the African Union: A 
Problematic Relationship’, in Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (eds.), The International 
Criminal Court and Africa, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) pp. 111-137. 
9 Kirsten Bowman, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: The Power of Politics 
and the Undermining of Justice’ in Joanna Nicholson (ed.), Strengthening the Validity of International 
Criminal Tribunals, (Brill, Leiden, 2017) pp. 245-270; Alexandre Skander Galant, UN Security 
Council Referrals to the International Criminal Court: Legal Nature, Effects and Limits, (Brill, Leiden, 
2018). 
10 Arts 1 and 17, ICC Statute. 




The political instability and infrastructure vulnerability that frequently accompanies 
the commission of international crimes means that the state of territoriality will often 
be unable to carry out criminal trials.12  Traditionally, bystander states were, and 
indeed may still be, unwilling to pursue prosecutions for diplomatic reasons. 13 
Indications are, however, that this traditional position may have begun to alter 
following the creation of the ICC and the efforts of states parties to enact domestic 
legislation implementing their obligations under the Statute. Some of that legislation 
has extended jurisdictional competence and authorises the prosecution of international 
crimes wherever they occur.14  Yet even where they are willing, inadequate legal 
cooperation regimes can thwart efforts to prosecute by making it difficult to gain 
information and evidence, access to witnesses and custody of suspects.15  
 
12 Alex Boraine, ‘Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way’ in Robert I. Rotberg and 
Dennis Thompson (eds.), Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2000) pp. 141-3; Jorge S Correa, ‘Dealing with Part Human Rights Violations: The 
Chilean Case After Dictatorship’, 67 Notre Dame Law Review (1992) 1455-1485; Mark Vassalo, 
‘Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General Considerations and a Critical Comparison of the 
Commissions of Chile and El Salvador’ 33 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (2002) 
153-182, pp. 159-60. 
13  Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003); Wolfgang Kalek, ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction 
in Europe 1998-2008’, 30 Michigan Journal of International Law (2009) 927-935. 
14  The ICC’s Legal Tools database contains details of all national implementing legislation. See 
www.legal-tools.org, accessed 17 July 2018. 
15 For an overview of past cases see Ward Ferdinandusse, ‘Improving Inter-State Cooperation for the 





There are currently no international or regional treaties focussed on inter-state 
cooperation in the prosecution of international crimes. The Genocide Convention and 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain only the most basic 
guidance on how states ought to cooperate and, at that, only in relation to genocide 
and war crimes committed in international armed conflict.16 Cooperation on crimes 
against humanity, which are not the subject of any specific treaty, is not regulated. 
Neither is that on war crimes committed in non-international armed conflict. The 
provision of assistance is therefore dependent upon existing methods of inter-state 
cooperation in international law. However, existing legal regimes, where they apply 
between states, were not designed with the aim of facilitating cooperation around 
international crimes, and, contain grounds for refusing assistance which are, arguably, 
not appropriate in this context.17 It is clear that international criminal law must look 
for new ways to maintain the impetus for effectively prosecuting international crimes 
and for improving cooperation in investigations and prosecutions.  
 
To that end, two new initiatives have emerged. The first is the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity (Draft Articles),18 which 
aims to create a global convention on prevention, punishment and inter-State 
 
16 See Section 2 below.  
17  A Legal Gap? Getting the Evidence where it can be found: Investigating and prosecuting 
international Crimes, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 22 November 2011; The Global Fight 
Against Impunity: The International Criminal Court and Dutch Foreign Policy, 7 August 2015. 
18 International Law Commission, Text and titles of the draft preamble, the draft articles and the draft 
annex provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, Prevention and punishment 
of crimes against humanity, A/CN.4/L.935, 15 May 2019.  
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cooperation with respect to crimes against humanity. 19  The second initiative, 
originally proposed by Belgium, Slovenia and the Netherlands, is broader in scope. 
The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty for core crimes (MLA Treaty)20 encompasses 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and seeks the conclusion of a 
multilateral cooperation treaty to enable the effective provision of mutual legal 
assistance and extradition of suspects in relation to these crimes. Despite their 
fundamental importance in the effective prosecution of international crimes, inter-
state judicial cooperation regimes, including these initiatives, have received little 
academic attention. 21  The aims of this article are to: (1) critically compare and 
contrast the extradition and mutual legal assistance regimes of these two initiatives; 
(2) analyse their respective merits and shortcomings in the effort to enhance inter-
state cooperation in the prosecution of international crimes; and (3) and assess their 
 
19 International Law Commission, First Report on Crimes Against Humanity by Sean D. Murphy, 
Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/680, 17 February 2015, para 12. 
20  Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, annexed to International Law Commission, 
Crimes Against Humanity, Additional comments and observation received from Governments, 
international organizations and others, Addendum, A/CN.4/726/Add.1, 28 March 2019, Annex II. See 
too Joint Initiative for Better International Cooperation in the Domestic Prosecution of International 
Crimes, Explanatory Note, 2015. 
21  Notable exceptions include: Dire Tladi, ‘A Horizontal Treaty on Cooperation in International 
Criminal Matters: The next step for the evolution of a comprehensive international criminal justice 
system?’ 29 South African Public Law (2014) 368-387; Sean D. Murphy, ‘New Mechanisms for 
Punishing Atrocities in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 16 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law (2015) 299-310; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Crimes Against Humanity: The Case for a Specialized 
Convention’, 9(4) Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2010) 575-594.  
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abilities to remedy current problems. It will argue that neither instrument possesses 
the requisite innovation to significantly reform international cooperation in this area.  
 
The article will begin by considering current cooperation regimes and the difficulties 
encountered in using them to facilitate international crimes prosecutions. It will then 
analyse the cooperation proposals within the ILC Draft Articles and the MLA Treaty 
and critically assess the two approaches. The article will demonstrate that the 
envisaged cooperation regimes are not particularly different – nor particularly 
inventive - but that the ILC sole focus on crimes against humanity leaves the impunity 
gap unplugged, as it does nothing to improve the inadequate existing regimes on 
genocide and war crimes. The article will conclude that if the prospects for effective 
prosecution of international crimes are to be enhanced, states must think more 
innovatively, break away from traditional models of cooperation and put national 
interests aside in the quest to secure international justice for the most serious crimes.   
 
 
2 Existing Regimes and the Need for Reform 
 
The importance of state cooperation in the prosecution of international crimes cannot 
be overstated. The nature of international crimes means that regardless of the forum in 
which they are to be prosecuted, cooperation between states or between states and 
institutions will be essential if trials are to be successful. In the aftermath of 
international crimes, large numbers of victims, witnesses and perpetrators tend to be 
displaced and located across different countries. The information and evidence 
necessary to prove international crimes, such as that related to military and security 
8 
 
operations, the policies of governments and other actors, and the actual commission 
of acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are likely to be held by a 
range of national and international institutions. The prosecuting body, whether it is a 
domestic court or international tribunal, will be dependent on the assistance of other 
states and entities to collect evidence, apprehend suspects, protect witnesses and track 
and seize assets belonging to alleged perpetrators. 22  Without cooperation regimes 
these tasks cannot be completed effectively and international crimes cannot be 
successfully prosecuted.  
 
 
2.1 Cooperation with International Courts and Tribunals 
 
Much attention has been paid to the work of international courts in the prosecution of 
international crimes. The crucial role that states play in facilitating and bolstering 
fact-finding and transfer of individuals needed to carry out trials within international 
courts seems sometimes to be overlooked. 23  The importance of cooperation is 
reflected in the statutes for the ICTY and ICTR and their Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.24 Both contain provisions obligating states to cooperate with the Tribunals 
across a range of pre and post-trial activities25  and to comply with requests for 
 
22 Pascal Turlan, ‘The International Criminal Court Cooperation Regime – A Practical Perspective 
from the Office of the Prosecutor’ in Bekou and Birkett, supra note 6, p.58-79. 
23 Antonio Cassese ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches 
of International Humanitarian Law’ 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) 2-17.  
24 Dagmar Stroh, ‘State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2001) 249-283.  
25 ICTY RoPE R54-61; ICTR RoPE R54-61. 
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assistance or orders issued by the Trial Chambers.26 As a result of their establishment 
under UN Security Council Chapter VII Resolutions, 27  and the near universal 
adherence of states to the UN Charter, the obligations to cooperate apply to almost all 
states. Although states have not always fully complied with the requests and orders of 
the Tribunals,28 in legal terms there are provisions in place to ensure that the ad hoc 
Tribunals can access the information and evidence needed to compile cases and to 
gain custody of individuals to stand trial. However, the cooperation arrangements 
within the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR are of no assistance when it comes to inter-
state cooperation as they pertain only to the relationship between states and the 
Tribunals and only to crimes committed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda.  
 
Cooperation obligations were not included within the statutes of the hybrid courts, 
often impeding the ability of these courts to fulfil their mandates.29 The significance 
of cooperation is recognised within the ICC Statute,30 where, although it has not 
 
26 Art 29 ICTY Statute; Art 28 ICTR Statute. 
27 UNSC Res 827, 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993) (ICTY); UNSC Res 955, 8 November 1994, 
S/RES/994 (1994) (ICTR). 
28 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for 
State Cooperation, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008).  
29 Megan Hirst and Howard Varney, Justice Abandoned? An Assessment of the Serious Crimes Process 
in East Timor, International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2005; Shakiratu Sanusi, ‘SCSL 
Practice on Cooperation with the Host State and Third States: A Contribution to Africa and 
International Criminal Justice’, in Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed.) The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its 
Legacy, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014)), 469-480.  
30 Phakiso Mochochoko, ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ in Roy S. Lee (ed) The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiation, Results, (Kluwer 
10 
 
always operated effectively to enable the Court to pursue criminal trials of those 
indicted,31 it occupies one of the most extensively regulated elements of the ICC 
regime.32 States Parties are under a general obligation to ‘cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of the crimes’ within the Statute33 and are to 
provide assistance in two main areas: arrest and surrender34 and the provision of other 
forms of assistance that the Court may require, which are listed at length.35 States 
parties are to ‘ensure that that there are procedures available under their national law 
for all the forms of cooperation’ specified in Part IX of the Statute.36 Reservations are 
not permitted. 37  The ICC can, additionally, receive cooperation from non-States 
Parties where an agreement to that effect is entered into38 and from international 
organisations, such as the UN.39 Frustratingly, despite the central place of national 
prosecution within the ICC complementarity regime, the ICC Statute only regulates 
the cooperation relationship between the Court and states. It does nothing to facilitate 
cooperation between states in the event that trials are pursued at national levels. 
 
Law International, The Hague,1999), pp. 305; Goran Sluiter, ‘The Surrender of War Criminals to the 
International Criminal Court’, 25 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 
(2003) 605-651.  
31 Ciampi, supra note 6.  
32 Part IX, ICC Statute. 
33 Art 86 ICC Statute. 
34 Arts 89-92 and 101-102, ICC Statute.  
35 Art 93(1)(a)-(l). 
36 Art 88, ICC Statute. 
37 Art 120 ICC Statute. 
38 Art 12(3) ICC Statute. 
39  Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (ICC-ASP/3/Res.1) 4 October 2004.  
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Where this is the case, states are dependent on existing methods of cooperation under 
international law.    
 
 
2.2 Cooperation Between States 
 
2.2.1 Obligations Relating to International Crimes 
 
Existing international legal frameworks regulating state cooperation in the 
prosecution of international crimes are haphazard, underdeveloped and spread across 
a multiplicity of instruments. Indeed, the ICC Statute apart, state obligations relating 
to the prosecution of international crimes are generally fragmented and lacking in 
clarity. Only a small number of international crimes incur an unequivocal demand for 
prosecution under treaty.40 Many of the most serious crimes are not the subject of 
 
40 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 
UNTS 227, Art. 6. 
40 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Art. 49; Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 85, Art. 50; Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art. 129; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Art. 146; International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 30 November 1973, 1015 UNTS 243, Art. 
4(b); UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Arts. 4(2) and 7; International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, New York, 20 December 2006, General 
12 
 
treaties that impose duties to prosecute and the extent to which there is a customary 
obligation to prosecute international crimes is contentious.41 While the majority of 
states and authoritative commentators agree that states have a right to prosecute,42 
there is not the same consensus on the existence or scope of any customary duty to 
prosecute. Some argue that customary law recognises a duty to prosecute for states in 
which an international crime is committed.43 Others contend that there is only an 
 
Assembly Resolution 61/177; Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, 
Belém, Brazil, 9 June 1994, (1994) 33 ILM 1529. 
41  Some have argued in favour of a customary duty to prosecute. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’, (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 63-74, at 67; Miles M. Jackson, ‘The Customary International Law Duty to Prosecute Crimes 
Against Humanity: A New Framework’, 16 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(2007) 117-156; Dianne Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime’, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) 2537-2615. Others are dubious. See 
Michael P. Scharf, ‘The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to 
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) 41-62; Roman Boed, 
‘The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators 
of Serious Human Rights Violations’, 33 Cornell International Law Journal (2000) 297-329; Ben 
Chigara, Amnesty in International Law: The Legality under International Law of National Amnesty 
Laws, (Pearson Education Ltd., Harlow, Essex: 2002).  
42  Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, (2nd. edn.) (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague: 2009), pp. 29, 69-70; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (7th edn.), (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 589-593; Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, (2nd edn.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.12. 
43  Claus Kress, ‘War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging 
System of International Criminal Justice’, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2001) 103-177, p.163; 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Amnesty and the International Criminal Court’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), 
International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Courts, 
(Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000), Ch. 8; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Duty to Prosecute 
13 
 
emerging customary duty to prosecute international crimes based on territoriality and, 
to some extent, nationality jurisdiction.44 Others still submit that the obligation aut 
dedere aut judicare has crystalized, or is in the process of crystalizing, into a rule of 
customary law for the core crimes proscribed by jus cogens.45  
 
Notwithstanding the absence of treaty obligations to prosecute, and disputes around 
the status of customary duties, the commission of international crimes is likely to 
result in international pressure to prosecute through some means, again emphasizing 
the importance of adequate cooperation regimes. Yet there is no general international 
legal obligation on states to provide judicial assistance to others seeking to prosecute 
international crimes. 46  There are currently no international or regional treaties 
focussed on inter-state cooperation relating to alleged perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity or war crimes committed in non-international armed conflict.  The few 
 
International Crimes Committed by Individuals’, in Hans-Joachim Cremer et al (eds.), Tradition und 
Weltoffenheit des Rechts: Festschrift fur Helmut Steinberge,  (Springer, Berlin, 2002) pp. 315-351, 
342; John Dugard, ‘Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions’, in Antonio Cassese, 
Paulo Gaeta and John Jones, (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, 2 vols., (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), vol. 2, 693–704, 696-69. 
44 Anja Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009), Ch. 7; Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and 
the International Criminal Court’, 14 EJIL (2003) 481-505.  
45  Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2018), p.165; Claire Mitchell, Aut Dedere, aut Judicare: The Extradite or Prosecute Clause in 
International Law, (Graduate Institute Publications, Genenva, 2009), p. 30 
46  Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between State 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p.119-123. 
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existing provisions pertaining to cooperation on genocide and war crimes committed 
during international armed conflict have been described as “rudimentary” in nature.47  
 
The simplistic nature of existing arrangements can be seen in the Genocide 
Convention.48  It requires states parties to ensure the availability of adequate penalties 
under national law where the crime of genocide 49  is committed. 50  However, 
obligations relating to prosecution are thin, requiring only the establishment of 
territorial jurisdiction, and giving brief mention to the potential jurisdiction of any 
international tribunal that might be created.51 The Convention states that genocide 
shall not be considered a political offence for the purposes of extradition, 52  but 
provides no framework for conducting extradition between states. Instead, states 
parties are to ‘grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force’.53 
Mutual legal assistance is not considered. The cooperation clauses of the Convention, 
or lack thereof, are thus considered to create something of a legal vacuum in the effort 
to prosecute genocide.54 
 
 
47 Kittichaisaree, supra note 45, p.165. 
48 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 
UNTS 277. 
49 Defined in Articles II and III. 
50 Article V.  
51 Article VI. 
52 Article VII. 
53 Ibid.  
54 A Legal Gap? supra note 17, p.23. 
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In relation to war crimes, the Geneva Conventions of 194955 contain provisions, in a 
common article,56 aimed at the prosecution of persons accused of having committed 
‘grave breaches’57 of the Conventions. High Contracting Parties are required to enact 
legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering 
any of the grave breaches. They are obligated to bring such persons, regardless of 
nationality, before their own courts, or if they prefer to ‘hand such persons over for 
trial to another High Contracting Party’. Yet, despite the inclusion of the aut dedere 
aut judicare mechanism, the Geneva Conventions do not provide a basis for 
extradition or the provision of mutual legal assistance. Only Additional Protocol I, 
applicable solely to crimes committed in international armed conflict, contains 
provisions for mutual legal assistance, stating that High Contracting Parties shall 
provide one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought in respect of grave beaches or of the Protocol. However, when it 
comes to extradition, the Protocol is weak, requiring only that ‘when circumstances 
permit, the High Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the matter of extradition’, 
giving ‘due consideration to the request of the state in whose territory the alleged 
offence has occurred’.58 Like those of the Genocide Convention, these provisions are 
vague. The actual processes of mutual legal assistance and extradition remain subject 
to whatever national laws and treaties the states concerned have in place and requests 
 
55 Supra note 52. 
56 Geneva Convention I, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, art. 129; 
Geneva Convention IV, art. 146. 
57 Geneva Convention I, Art 50;  Geneva Convention II, Art 51; Geneva Convention III, Art 130; 
Geneva Convention IV, Art 147. 
58 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3, Article 88(2).  
16 
 
for assistance in relation to the most serious international crimes remain open to 
refusal on traditional grounds, such as the political offence exception.59  
 
The International Law Commission points, additionally, to the potential utility of 
Conventions that deal with specific crimes against humanity, 60  such as torture,61 
enforced disappearance62 and apartheid.63 It is true that these Conventions contain 
obligations related to extradition and the provision of judicial assistance, and that they    
could be relevant in situations where the crimes that they regulate are committed on a 
widespread or systematic basis against civilian populations. However, this is a 
fragmented method of facilitating judicial cooperation. These Conventions cover only 
a small number of the different crimes against humanity meaning that for the others 
there is no specific treaty regime enabling cooperation in their prosecution. 
 
In short, international law currently lacks a comprehensive treaty regulating how 
states should cooperate in the prosecution of international crimes. Even where inter-
state cooperation is mentioned within treaties pertaining to international crimes, such 
 
59 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, Commentary to Additional Protocol I, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987, para 
3580. 
60 International Law Commission, First Report on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 19, paras. 73-
77. 
61 Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, Arts 4(2) and 7. 
62 International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, supra note 
40, Arts 4 and 9. See also Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, Belem, 
Brazil, 9 June 1994, (1994) 3 International Legal Materials 1529, Arts III and VI. 
63 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 
40, Art 4(b). 
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as in the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols, they direct states to their existing, general mutual legal assistance and 
extradition treaties, rather than creating regimes aimed at facilitating cooperation in 
the unique circumstances of international crimes.64  
 
 
 2.2.2 State Practice in Prosecuting International Crimes 
 
There are a large number of international, regional and bilateral treaties and 
arrangements that regulate the provision of mutual legal assistance and extradition 
between states in criminal matters.65 Yet for a range of reasons they have not proven 
effective in facilitating cooperation between states in relation to international crimes. 
At the most basic level, no state has agreements in place with all others. Where there 
is no treaty agreement between states, practice shows that the provision of assistance 
is at best extremely slow and more likely non-existent. Many states require a legal 
basis for the provision of assistance and most are more likely to cooperate where they 
 
64 One notable regional instrument in this field is the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of 
the Crimes of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination 
2006, adopted at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 26 November 2006, which 
aims to strengthen regional and international cooperation in relation to international crimes (Preamble, 
para. 5.). It too, however, is light on the technicalities of extradition and provides no framework for 
mutual legal assistance. 
65  M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement 
Mechanisms, vol. II, 3rd ed., (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008); David A. Sadoff, Bringing 




have a legal obligation to do so.66 Many existing agreements were concluded at a time 
when there was little experience of prosecuting international crimes and therefore do 
not reflect the complex procedural cooperation that has since been proved necessary 
to bring such crimes to trial.67 International treaties which do contain more modern 
cooperation arrangements, such as the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC) 68  and the UN Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC), 69  are primarily concerned with crimes of corruption and those of a 
transnational, organised nature, rather than international human rights crimes. These 
instruments do not adapt easily to accommodate international crimes within the 
parameters of their definitions. Even where agreements are in place, mutual legal 
assistance and extradition treaties traditionally include a range of flexible and 
nebulous grounds upon which requests for assistance can be denied.70  
 
In practice, the combination of the lack of relevant agreements between states and the 
manipulation of grounds for refusal where agreements are in place, have thwarted 
efforts by third states to prosecute international crimes. In 1974, Bolivia refused a 
French request for extradition of Klaus Barbie who had been convicted in absentia in 
France for war crimes committed during the Second World War on the basis that 
 
66 The Global Fight Against Impunity, supra note 17, p.46 
67 A Legal Gap, supra note 17, p.31. 
68 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, A/Res/55/25, 15 November 
2000. 
69 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003, 2349 UNTS 41. 
70 These will be discussed below.  
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there was no applicable extradition treaty between the two states.71 Ethiopia failed to 
gain custody of Mengistu in order to try him for genocide as neither Zimbabwe or 
South Africa would extradite in the absence of an extradition treaty. 72  In 2002, 
Indonesia refused to extradite officials suspected of crimes against humanity to East 
Timor because there was no extradition treaty in place. 73  Numerous states have 
refused or delayed extradition to the former Yugoslav countries and Rwanda, 
sometimes due to the lack of an extradition treaty and in some cases due to 
impediments such as national statutes of limitation and rules prohibiting extradition of 
nationals. 74  In 2006, despite cooperation treaties, 75  Guatemala impeded Spanish 
access to information relating to international crimes committed during the 
 
71 See Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep., (Plenary), Klaus Altmann (Barbie) v. France, Application No. 
10689/83, Decision of 4 July 1984 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 
37, pp. 225-235. 
72  ‘Ethiopia-South Africa: Mengistu Extradition Request’, IRIN, 6 December 1999, available 
at http://www.irinnews.org/report/11047/ethiopia-south-africa-mengistu-extradition-request, accessed 2 
August 2018. See also Bernard Hibbitts, ‘No Zimbabwe Extradition Of Mengistu After Ethiopia 
Genocide Conviction’, Jurist, 13 December 2006, available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/12/no-
zimbabwe-extradition-of-mengistu.php, accessed 2 August 2018. 
73 Richard Galpin, ‘Indonesia Rejects Timor Extraditions’, BBC News, 19 February 2002, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1828846.stm, accessed 2 August 2018. 
74 Miljenko Dorić, Explanatory Memorandum, The Obligation of Member and Observer States of The 
Council of Europe to Co-Operate in the Prosecution of War Crimes, Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, 17 December 2010, para. 16-21; African Rights and Redress, Extraditing Genocide 
Suspects From Europe to Rwanda: Issues and Challenges, 1 July 2008. 
75 Extradition Treaty Between Spain and Guatemala, Guatemala, 7 November 1895. 
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Guatemalan civil war and refused extradition of former officials. 76  Similarly, 
Argentina maintained a twenty-year refusal to cooperate with France, Italy and Spain 
in their attempts to prosecute violations committed by members of the Argentinean 
military junta.77  The Argentinean authorities claimed that foreign courts could not 
prosecute crimes that had been committed in Argentina due to the principle of 
territoriality.78  Senegal refused numerous Belgian extradition requests for Hissene  
Habre, despite aut dedere aut judicare and cooperation obligations under the 
Convention Against Torture.79 
 
There have been some trials at national levels. There were a number of prosecutions 
following the Second World War. However, these were often for “ordinary” crimes 
under domestic law rather than for international crimes, with jurisdiction exercised on 
 
76 ‘Arrest Warrants Against Former Military Officials’, Rights Action/NISGUA (Network in Solidarity 
with Guatemala), 12 November 2006; ‘Spain Seeks Guatemalan Ex-Rulers’, BBC News, 23 December 
2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6205327.stm, accessed 5 November 2019. 
77 Roseann M. Latore, ‘Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations by South American Military Regimes’, 25 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review (2002) 419-448; Maria Fernandez Perez Solla, ‘Enforced Disappearance before 
Argentinean Tribunals: New Developments in an Endless Fight for Justice’, 9 South African Journal 
on Human Rights (2003) 691-716.  
78 Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Reluctant Partner: The Argentine Government’s Failure to Back 
Trials of Human Rights Violators, December 2001, Part VII; Rebecca Litchfield, ‘Accountability in 
Argentina: 20 Years Later Transitional Justice Maintains Momentum’ International Center for 
Transitional Justice August 2005, p. 5. This is no longer the position in Argentina. See ‘Argentina: 
President Allows Extraditions’, New York Times, 26 July 2003.  
79 International Court of Justice, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422. 
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nationality, territoriality or passive personality grounds.80 Prosecutions by third states 
on the grounds of universality were rare.81 The human rights abuses of the cold war 
regimes went largely unpunished in the states of territoriality at the time.82 Attempts 
by third states to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds of protective and passive 
personality jurisdiction over torture and enforced disappearance committed by 
members of foreign regimes amounted, at best, to in absentia convictions. 83 
Following the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, some European 
states undertook trials of those accused of international crimes, who had fled to their 
territory as a result of the conflicts. In many cases, these states exercised jurisdiction 
over the crimes concerned under the universality principle, without the traditional 
territoriality or nationality links to the crimes, the defendant, or the victims.84  Yet a 
number of the legal personnel involved in these prosecutions lament the technical 
difficulties of accessing information and evidence from other states using traditional 
judicial cooperation agreements.85  
 
 
80 Alex Marschik, ‘The Politics of Prosecution: European National Approaches to War Crimes’, in 
Timothy L.H. McCormack and Gerry Simpson,  (eds.), The Law of War Crimes: National and 
International Approaches, (Kluwer, The Hague, 1997), pp.65-101.  
81 The Eichmann trial was a notable exception. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 
ILR 5; Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 227. 
82 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’, in Naomi Roht-Arriaza and 
Javier Mariezcurrena, (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus 
Justice, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), pp.1-16, at .3-4. 
83 Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Enforce Legislation, 
Chapter Two, The History of Universal Jurisdiction,  AI Index: IOR 53/004/2001, 1 September 2001. 
84 Reydams, supra note 13, pp.147-157, 220-222. 
85 A Legal Gap? supra note 17; The Global Fight Against Impunity, supra note 17. 
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It is clear that if states are to assume a more active role in prosecuting international 




3 International Law Commission Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity 
 
 
In 2013, the International Law Commission (ILC) placed the topic of crimes against 
humanity on its long-term work programme,86 moving it to its current programme a 
year later and appointing a Special Rapporteur. 87 It did so on the basis that: (1) of the 
three core crimes – genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – only crimes 
against humanity are not the subject of a global treaty requiring states to prevent and 
punish them and cooperate to that end; (2) crimes against humanity may be more 
prevalent than either genocide, which requires a specific intent, or war crimes, 
because they can be committed in situations where there is no armed conflict; and (3) 
treaties on prevention, punishment and inter-state cooperation exist for far less serious 
offences.88 The conclusion was that ‘a global convention on prevention, punishment 
and inter-State cooperation with respect to crimes against humanity appears to be a 
key missing piece in the current framework of international law’.89 The objective for 
 
86 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 
68th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, at 116, para. 170 and Annex B (2013). 
87 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 
69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, at 247, para. 266 
88 International Law Commission, supra note 19, paras. 10-11. 
89 Ibid, para 12. 
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the ILC was to draft articles for what could become a convention on the prevention 
and punishment of crimes against humanity. 90   Despite the inadequacies of the 
cooperation regimes relating to all three of the core crimes outlined above, and 
without conducting any meaningful investigation into the effectiveness of the 
genocide and war crimes cooperation regimes, the ILC dismissed the idea it should 
undertake work on a more expansive initiative. It stated that genocide and war crimes 
are ‘already the subject of widely-adhered to global treaties relating to their 
prevention and punishment’ and that these could be updated through a new 
instrument.91 Thus, from the outset, the ILC project maintains and indeed reinforces a 
fragmentation in how inter-state cooperation on prosecuting international crimes will 
be regulated and exercised.92 
 
The Draft Convention has three principal aims: prevention, punishment and inter-
State cooperation. It imposes a general obligation on States Parties to prevent and 
punish crimes against humanity93 through effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
and other measures.94 Crimes against humanity are defined in accordance with Article 
7 of the ICC Statute95 in light of its wide acceptance by states, in order to minimize 
fragmentation in international criminal law and to promote the complementarity 
 
90 Ibid, para 13.  
91 Ibid, para 15. See also Murphy, supra note 24, p.308. 
92 Tladi, supra note 21, p.382. 
93 Draft Article 2. 
94 Draft Article 4.  
95 Draft Article 3.  
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regime of the ICC. 96 States parties are required to ensure domestic criminalization of 
crimes against humanity,97 to establish territorial, nationality and passive personality 
jurisdiction, not excluding the possibility of other criminal jurisdiction under national 
law, and to ensure that jurisdiction can be exercised when an alleged offender is 
present on their territory.98 An aut dedere aut judicare obligation is included in draft 
article 10 and stipulates that states parties shall prosecute an alleged offender unless 
the person is extradited or surrendered to another state or competent international 






Extradition, along with mutual legal assistance, forms one of the lengthiest 
provisions99  of the Draft Convention. This reflects the central role of extradition 
within the draft Convention, through draft article 7 and the establishment of 
jurisdiction and draft article 10 on aut dedere aut judicare.  Both of these obligations 
can be discharged through the extradition of the alleged offender to another State for 
prosecution. Extradition under the draft Convention is largely modeled on the UN 
 
96  International Law Commission, supra note 19, para 122; Report of the International Law 
Commission, Seventy-First Session (29 April-7 June 2019 and 8 July-9 August 2019), (A/74/10), 
Chapter IV, p.30. 
97 Draft Article 6. For a detailed analysis of this provision see Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Criminalization of 
Crimes Against Humanity under National Law’, 16 JICJ (2018) 729-749. 
98 Draft Article 7.  
99 Draft Article 13. 
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Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and to a lesser extent the UN Convention 
on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). The Commentary to the Draft Articles 
explains that these instruments are relied upon because the issues arising in the 
context of extradition are largely the same regardless of the underlying crime. 100  It is 
true that organized crime, corruption and crimes against humanity share the 
characteristic of complexity. However, crimes against humanity are arguably more 
internationally politically contentious and contested than the crimes dealt with under 
UNTOC and UNCAC. Reliance on UNTOC and UNCAC is further justified on the 
grounds that these Conventions have large numbers of states parties, states are 
familiar with their processes, and the language within them has been explained in 
detailed guides developed by UNODC.101  Whether state familiarity is a robust basis 
for modeling a new treaty on existing provisions must be questioned.102 
 
Draft Article 13(1) obliges states to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify 
evidentiary requirements in relation to extradition requests concerning crimes against 
humanity. There is no provision on dual criminality. The requirement under draft 
article 5 to criminalize crimes against humanity under national law means that crimes 
against humanity will be offences under the laws of both the requesting and requested 
 
100 Report of the International Law Commission, Seventy-First Session (29 April-7 June 2019 and 8 
July-9 August 2019), A/74/10, Chapter IV. 
101 International Law Commission, Fourth Report on crimes against humanity by Sean D. Murphy, 
Special Rapporteur, (A/CN.4/725), 18 February 2019, para. 120. 
102 On this point see comments of Escobar Hernandez in International Law Commission, Sixty-ninth 




state and dual criminality will therefore be satisfied.103 Under Draft Article 13(2) 
crimes against humanity104 are to be deemed extraditable offences in any existing 
extradition treaty between states and are to be included in any extradition treaties 
subsequently concluded.  
 
In accordance with evolving practice, 105  the political offence exception is not 
permitted as a ground for refusal of extradition between states. 106   This is to be 
welcomed as many states in which crimes against humanity have been committed in 
the past have framed those crimes as “political” within domestic legislation. 107 
Exclusion of the political offence exception removes the possibility of this ground 
being manipulated as a means of refusing extradition. It ought to be noted, however, 
 
103 International Law Commission, Third Report on Crimes Against Humanity by Sean D. Murphy, 
Special Rapporteur, (A/CN.4/704), 23 January 2017, paras. 31-36. See also Commentary to the Draft 
Articles, in ILC Report, Seventy-First Session, supra note 99, pp.120-121.  
104 To be interpreted as encompassing the crimes of draft articles 3 and 6. See International Law 
Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session, Statement of the Chairman, 1 June 2017, p 7. 
105 Current treatment of the political offence exception in international law is set out in International 
Law Commission, Third Report, supra note 103, paras. 42-49. Note also that the statutes of the ad hoc 
Tribunals do not permit states to refuse to transfer individuals on the basis that the offence concerned is 
political. Likewise, the ICC Statute does not allow for refusal of requests for surrender on the grounds 
that the request relates to a political crime.  
106 Draft Article 13(3). 
107  Chile: Supreme Decree No. 355, Creation of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 
Santiago, 25 April 1990, Art. 1; South Africa: Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
No. 34 of 1995, Preamble; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation No. 2001/10 on 
the Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, UN Doc. 
UNTAET/REG/2001/10, 12 July 2001, s.3.1(a). 
27 
 
that while the exclusion accords with much of the academic scholarship,108 and was 
approved by many delegations in the Sixth Committee, others expressed the view that 
the exclusion is contrary to contemporary extradition practice, suggesting that this 
may be an issue that has not entirely been settled.109     
 
States that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty are permitted to 
use the draft Convention as the legal basis for extradition in the event that they 
receive a request for extradition from a state with which they have no treaty 
arrangement in place under Article 13(4). They are to notify the UN Secretary 
General whether they intend to use the Draft Convention as the legal basis for 
extradition to and from states with which they have no treaty.110 This provision is 
weaker than in the first version of the draft article on extradition,111 which favoured a 
provision that would have made using the draft Convention as a basis for extradition 
in the absence of an existing treaty the default position. The Drafting Committee 
considered it necessary to make this change in order to bring the draft convention in 
line with the “generally accepted approach” of UNCAC and UNTOC, adding that the 
 
108 Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in the Draft Convention on Crimes 
Against Humanity’, 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2018) 795-812, pp.799-801. 
109 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
sixty-ninth session (1 May-2 June and 3 July-4 August 2017), (A/72/10). UNGA, Topical summary of 
the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its seventy-second session, 
prepared by the Secretariat, (A/CN.4/713), 26 February 2018, p.103. See also ILC Fourth Report on 
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 101, para. 244.  
110 Draft Article 13(4)(a). 
111 International Law Commission, Third Report on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 103, Annex, 
Draft Article 11(4)(a) 
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amendment would also add clarity for judges in applying and interpreting the 
instrument.112  This author is not convinced of the need to follow the approach of 
UNCAC and UNTOC in this regard, nor that the alteration provides any additional 
clarity. Where a state will not use the draft Convention, it is to seek the conclusion of 
extradition treaties with other states parties.113  For those that do not make extradition 
conditional upon a treaty, crimes against humanity are to be considered extraditable 
offences.114  
 
Draft Articles 13(4) and (5) largely mirror arrangements under Article 44(5) of the 
UNCAC and Article 16(4) and (5) UNTOC. At first glance, this appears a logical 
means of plugging the impunity gap as prosecutions of international crimes can be 
impeded because of the lack of relevant treaties between states. However, recent 
research demonstrates that UNCAC and UNTOC have rarely been used by states 
parties as a basis for extradition. Admittedly, it is difficult to obtain comprehensive 
information on this issue due to the lack of effective reporting and review 
mechanisms under the treaties. Although the Implementation Review Mechanism for 
UNCAC has been operational since 2010, there has only been one cycle of review on 
international cooperation.115 The data provided by states shows, however, that they 
 
112 International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session, Statement of the Chairman, 1 June 2017, p.8. 
113 Draft Article 13(4)(b). 
114 Draft Article 13(5). 
115  Information on the Implementation Review Mechanism can be found at: 




generally use bilateral and regional frameworks as the legal bases for extradition116 
and that few rely on UNCAC in practice.117 Reasons for this are varied and include: 
lack of knowledge among practitioners about the possibility of using the Convention; 
lack of decision making on using the Convention as a legal basis for extradition 
among governmental and judicial authorities; and a general preference for using 
bilateral or regional extradition treaties. 118  Likewise, although there is as yet no 
review mechanism in place for UNTOC,119 a recent study suggests that little use is 
being made of UNTOC as a basis for extradition, with states preferring to use regional 
or bilateral treaties.120  This raises questions as to whether the draft Convention is 
likely to improve the prospects for extradition in the case of crimes against humanity. 
If states parties to UNTOC and UNCAC continue to prefer to use existing treaties for 
extradition in relation to corruption and organized crime, there is nothing to suggest 
that matters should be any different for crimes against humanity. If that is the case, 
 
116  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, State of Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. Criminalization, law enforcement and international cooperation (2nd 
edn) (Vienna, 2017), p.197. 
117 Ibid, 204. 
118 Ibid, 204-5. 
119 The need for a review mechanism under UNTOC was acknowledged in 2014. See Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 7/1, 
Strengthening the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols thereto, 2014. There is, however, still no agreement between states parties on 
the form the review mechanisms should take. See ‘Divisions Thwart UNTOC review process’ Global 
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 4 May 2018. 
120 Neil Boister, ‘The Cooperation Provisions of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime: A Toolbox Rarely Used?’ 16 International Criminal Law Review (2016) 39-70. 
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then the draft articles are unlikely to significantly improve the current situation on 
cooperation in the extradition of suspects.  
 
Draft Article 13(7) provides that extradition shall be subject to the conditions of the 
national law of the requested State or applicable extradition treaties, including the 
grounds upon which the requested State may refuse extradition’, with the 
Commentary to any forthcoming Convention outlining acceptable and unacceptable 
conditions for refusal.121 This provision is disappointingly lacking in innovation. As 
Amnesty International has pointed out, it will enable states to refuse extradition on the 
grounds often found in national law, such as prohibition of extradition of nationals or 
ne bis in idem prohibitions, which might also be exploited to protect sham trials.122 
Some states have also raised concerns about the retention of these barriers. 123  In 
response, the Special Rapporteur has reiterated that the overriding obligation of draft 
article 9 requires that where they do not extradite, states must submit cases to their 
own prosecuting authorities. 124   The provision has also been defended as simply 
reflecting grounds for refusal that are generally accepted in extradition law. 125 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to escape the sense that this provision, without specific 
limitations, represents a wasted opportunity to create a modern cooperation regime 
 
121 International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session, Statement of the Chairman, 1 June 2017, p 9. 
122 Amnesty International, International Law Commission: Commentary to the Third Report on Crimes 
Against Humanity, Index: IOR 40/5817/2017, April, p 9-10. 
123 See for example, Argentina’s comments on the non-extradition of nationals, ILC Fourth Report 
supra note 101, para 250.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Harmen van der Wilt, supra note 108, 803. 
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around the most serious international crimes that does away with traditional barriers 
to extradition.  126 
 
Draft article 13(8) concerns expedition and simplification of procedures. In line with 
Draft Article 7’s requirement to expand jurisdiction, Draft Article 13(9) obliges states 
which restrict extradition to those on whose territory the alleged offence was 
committed to alter this practice by ‘pretending’ that the offences also occurred in the 
territory of the state that has established jurisdiction. Draft article 13(10) suggests that 
where extradition of nationals for enforcement of a sentence is prohibited under 
national law, the state of nationality consider enforcing the sentence itself and draft 
article 13(11) deal with requests made on impermissible grounds.  Draft Article 
13(12) is concerned with requests made by states in which the offence occurred and, 
lastly, Draft Article 13(13) requires requested states to consult with requesting states 
before refusing requests.  
 
 
3.2 Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
 
Mutual legal assistance is regulated under Draft Article 14 and an annex to the draft 
articles. Draft Article 14 regulates cooperation between states when they seek judicial 
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity. The annex 
consists of procedural rules and applies either where there is no existing MLAT 
 
126 Claus Kress and Sevane Garibian, ‘Laying the Foundations for a Convention on Crimes Against 
Humanity: Concluding Observations,’, 16 JICJ (2018) 909-957. 
32 
 
between states or where they prefer to use the annex rather than an existing treaty.127 
States are encouraged – though not required - to apply the annex if it facilitates 
cooperation.128 
 
Under Draft Article 14(1) states are to ‘afford each other the widest measure of 
mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings’ 
relating to crimes against humanity. Such assistance is to be provided in respect of 
offences for which a legal person may be held liable and is not limited to natural legal 
persons.129  The purposes for which mutual legal assistance can be sought are listed in 
draft Article 14(3) and relate primarily to the collection of evidence and the 
identification and location of persons of interest. Van der Wilt explains that while 
many of these are routinely found in MLATs, others, such as assistance in gaining 
forensic evidence 130  and identification of victims 131  are particularly important in 
prosecutions of international crimes. Assistance is not to be refused on the ground of 
bank secrecy under draft article 14(4). States are urged to consider the conclusion of 
additional bi- or multilateral agreements to further the provision of mutual legal 
assistance in relation to crimes against humanity in draft Article 14(5). They are also 
permitted, under Article 14(6), to transmit information to another state without prior 
request, if it is believed that this will assist the other state in undertaking or 
concluding investigations, prosecutions and other proceedings.  
 
 
127 Draft Article 14(8). 
128 Ibid. 
129 Draft Article 14(2). 
130 Draft Article 14(3)(e). 
131 Draft Article 14(3)(a) 
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Draft Article 14(7) provides that the Draft Convention shall not prejudice other treaty 
obligations. In a previous draft, the provisions of draft article 14 were to apply where 
they provided for greater mutual legal assistance than existing obligations. However, 
Germany’s claim that this should be rejected because it creates legal uncertainty in 
light of the priority given to existing arrangements under draft Article 14(2) was 
followed,132 and the phrase ‘except that the provisions of this draft article shall apply 
to the extent that they provide for greater mutual legal assistance” was deleted in the 
most recent draft. This brings the draft Convention in line with obligations under 
UNTOC and UNCAC. Yet even before the German objections were raised, Amnesty 
International had pointed out that some existing treaties require states to refuse 
assistance on inappropriate grounds, such as pardons, and that these ought to be 
revised or considered superseded.133 Previously, such grounds should not have proved 
problematic because Article 14 would have become applicable, providing for greater 
assistance. The result of this revision is that a number of obstructive provisions under 
existing arrangements will continue to have effect, even where they thwart the 
provision of assistance. If facilitating cooperation around crimes against humanity is 
the draft Convention’s objective, it might have been better to sacrifice some certainty 
and familiarity in the interests of maximizing the possibilities for cooperation by 
removing restrictive grounds for refusal of assistance. 
 
The final section of draft article 14 urges states to consider agreements with 
international mechanisms established under the UN that have a mandate to collect 
 
132 ILC Fourth Report, supra note 101, para 268-269. 
133 Amnesty International, supra note 122, p 13. 
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evidence of crimes against humanity.134 This is intended to fill the gap that exists for 
some states that require formal frameworks in order to exchange information with a 
UN established body.135  
 
As mentioned, draft Article 14 is complemented by a Draft Annex, which contains a 
‘mini mutual assistance treaty’.136 Paragraph 2 requires states to designate a central 
authority to receive and process requests for assistance. There is no requirement, or 
indeed encouragement, to designate law enforcement officials as the central authority 
in an effort to ensure independence and impartiality in decisions on requests for 
assistance. Instead, the diplomatic, political channels still used by a number of states 
can be retained. 137  Paragraphs 3 and 4 set out the format for making requests, 
paragraph 5 allows for requests for supplemental information, and paragraphs 6 and 7 
regulate responses by the requested state, emphasizing the need for timely execution. 
 
Under paragraph 8, requests may be refused, with reasons,138 on a number of grounds, 
including where the requested state considers that execution of the request is likely to 
prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests. These 
grounds are routine across existing MLATs, and will therefore continue to apply in 
many cases where states rely on existing arrangements. It is, however, disappointing 
 
134 Draft Article 14(9). This follows a proposal by the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect. 
135 ILC Fourth Report, supra note 101, para. 272. 
136 See International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session, Statement of the Chairman, 1 June 2017, 
p.10. 
137 Amnesty International, supra note 122, p.14. 
138 Paragraph 9. 
35 
 
to see them replicated here, given their legal ambiguity and their propensity to 
exploitation by states reluctant to cooperate. While international criminal law no 
longer accepts unilateral assertions of national sovereignty139 or national security as 
grounds for refusing assistance to international courts,140 inter-state assistance in cases 
involving serious human rights violations has often been refused on these grounds.141 
The breadth of information covered by ‘national security’ and the ease with which 
states can classify categories of information as relating to it142 makes this an easy 
means of avoiding assistance for a state that is unwilling to provide judicial 
assistance. The ground of threats to public order is similarly open to exploitation. It 
has been suggested that this ground is rarely invoked and serves only as a protection 
in principle for states.143 However, in states that have experienced crimes against 
 
139 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108BIS, Judgment on the Request of the 
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, 
para. 65; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Judgment of the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction, 18 June 1997. See also Salavatore Zappala, ‘Blaskic Subpoena Proceedings’, in 
Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009), pp.613-615 
140 ICC Statute, Art. 72.  
141 Alison Bisset, ‘Truth Commissions: A Barrier to the Provision of Judicial Assistance?’ 10 
International Criminal Law Review (2010) 647-678. 
142 David Banisar, ‘Freedom of Information, International Trends and National Security’, Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, October 2002; Campbell Public Affairs Institute 
(ed.), National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance, (Campbell Public Affairs 
Institute, New York, 2003), 75-101. 
143 Kimberly Prost, ‘Toward Meaningful Adherence to Multilateral Instruments for Meaningful 
Cooperation: The Challenges to Effective Mutual Legal Assistance’ in Rodrigo Yepes-Enriquez and 
Lisa Tabassi (eds.), Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters with 
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humanity, the threat posed by criminal prosecutions to peace and stability is often 
advanced as an argument against pursuing trials.144 Such fears may be legitimate or 
may be fabrications to avoid criminal accountability. Nevertheless, the availability of 
this ground for refusal provides an uncooperative state with legally permissible 
grounds for refusing assistance.  
 
The inclusion of these ‘vague and subjective’ grounds for refusal has been strongly 
criticized as one of the main problems under the current legal framework, the 
retention of which are likely to prove counterproductive in a treaty designed to 
improve state cooperation in relation to crimes against humanity.145  The ILC has 
been urged to reconsider this provision and adopt the ‘more circumscribed’ language 
of Article 93(3) of the ICC Statute.146 This obliges states to consult with the Court, 
where execution of requests are prevented by national laws, in order to resolve the 
matter and in an effort to find alternative means of providing assistance. Ironically, 
however, even in light of requests from states themselves for greater clarity on these 
‘indeterminate legal concepts’, the ILC has remained unshakeable in its stance that 
 
Special Reference to the Chemical Weapons Convention (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2002) pp.480-
491, 484. 
144 Alison Bisset, Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2012), pp.162-164. 
145 Amnesty International, supra note 122, p 15; War Crimes Committee of the International Bar 
Association, Comments on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles in Crimes Against 
Humanity, November 2018, p12.  
146 Kress and Garibian,  supra note 126. 
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adherence to the existing and familiar language of UNTOC and UNCAC is desirable 
on the grounds of legal certainty.147 
 
Although not a ground for refusal, paragraph 10 permits the requested state to 
postpone mutual legal assistance where it interferes with an ongoing investigation, 
prosecution or judicial proceeding. The question of whether national level initiatives 
such as amnesty schemes and truth seeking mechanisms might prevent – or be used to 
impede – the provision of mutual legal assistance has been raised previously.148 It has 
been suggested that paragraph 10 should have a timeliness phrase imposed in relation 
to the length of time a requested state can delay the provision of assistance in order to 
mitigate the risk of indefinite delays where the requested state is either unable or 
unwilling to provide assistance.149 This has not been incorporated within the most 
recent version of the draft Convention. However, this would not resolve the issue of 
whether a national amnesty law might prevent the provision of assistance in certain 
circumstances, for instance if the requested, amnesty granting state considers that 
security, public order or other interests might be jeopardized if it were to provide 
assistance to a state that might potentially prosecute an individual already granted 
amnesty. Indeed, the wider and contentious question of amnesties remains unsettled 
within the draft Convention.150 The ILC has stated that an amnesty by one state will 
 
147 ILC Fourth Report, supra note 101, para 291. 
148 Bisset, supra note 141. 
149 International Bar Association, supra note 145, p12. 
150 ILC Fourth Report, supra note 101, paras. 302-305. Sarah M.H. Nouwen ‘Is There Something 
Missing in the Proposed Convention on Crimes Against Humanity? A Political Question for States and 
a Doctrinal One for the International Law Commission’, 16 JICJ (2018) 877-908; Hugo A. Relva, 
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not prevent prosecution by another with jurisdiction and that any amnesty would need 
to be evaluated in light of a state’s treaty obligations. However, the ILC has stopped 
short of prohibiting amnesties, justifying its silence, once again, on the ground that 
other treaties are similarly quiet.151  
 
Beyond this, the Draft Annex contains little of controversy. Paragraph 13 covers 
purpose limitation, paragraph 14 concerns confidentiality surrounding requests, and 
paragraph 15 ensures “safe conduct’ for witnesses, experts and others who assist in 
investigations or proceedings in the requesting state.  Paragraphs 17-19 then regulate 
the transfer for the purposes of testimony or identification of persons of those 
detained or serving sentences in the requested state. All of these provisions are 
routinely contained within MLATs.  
 
Yet one of the biggest impediments to inter-state cooperation and the exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction - the immunities enjoyed by incumbent heads of state and 
other high ranking state officials - remains a murky area within the ILC Draft 
Convention. Draft Article 6(5) prohibits reliance on the holding of an official position 
as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, but the commentaries to draft 
Article 6 state that this ‘has no effect on any procedural immunity that a foreign State 
official may enjoy before a national criminal jurisdiction’.152 While there is some 
 
‘Three Propositions for a Future Convention on Crimes Against Humanity: The Prohibition on 
Amnesties, Military Courts, and Reservations’ 16 JICJ (2018) 857-875. 
151 Report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-ninth session, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Seventy-first session, Supplement No. 10 (A/72/10), para. 46; Commentary to draft articles 
10, para. 11. 
152 ILC Third Report, supra note 103, at 69. 
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reluctant acceptance that the introduction of a treaty based waiver of immunities 
ratione personae would have been politically impossible, 153  the ILC’s failure to 
address the issue of immunity ratione materiae has been strongly criticised.154 A full 
discussion of immunities is outside the scope of this article, but as Kress and Garibian 
explain, ‘the real practical impact of the future Convention is intimately connected 
with the immunity question’.155 
 
In sum, the cooperation aspects of the ILC Draft Convention are conservative, with 
much copied over from existing arrangements. While this might be perceived as a 
strength, with familiarity enhancing the prospects for gaining the acceptance of states, 
it is also likely to be its downfall. The retention of traditional grounds for refusing 
assistance makes withholding cooperation easy. The failure to incorporate a more 
innovative system of cooperation, abolishing traditional grounds, and the absence of 
scrutiny mechanisms that might make refusal more difficult is one of the most 
disappointing aspects of the draft Convention. The ILC cannot be unaware of the 
ways in which states have sought to withhold cooperation in the past and how existing 
mechanisms enable that. While no Convention will stop the truly uncooperative state, 
the possibilities for ‘legal’ hampering should have been restricted in the new 
convention, even if this requires countries to grapple with a new system of inter-state 
cooperation. States are already adept at utilising multiple cooperation systems as 
those applicable in the relationship between states and international courts differ from 
 
153 Kress and Garibian, supra note 126, at 939-40. 
154 Micaela Frulli, ‘The Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity and Immunities: Unfinished 
Business?’ 16 JICJ (2018) 775-793. 
155 Kress and Garibian, supra note 126, at 939. 
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the inter-state system. Indeed, it is a pity that the ILC did not take the opportunity to 
bring inter-state cooperation arrangements in line with international criminal law 
standards on grounds for refusing assistance when it comes to the international crime 
of crimes against humanity.   
 
 
4 The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty for Core Crimes 
 
 
Separate from the ILC’s development of the Draft Articles, a ‘core group of states’156 
has been working on a treaty that would enhance mutual legal assistance in the 
investigation and prosecution of all three core crimes.157 The Mutual Legal Assistance 
Initiative is premised on the idea that the inadequacies of narrow and outdated 
existing inter-state cooperation arrangements relating to core crimes are one of the 
biggest impediments to ending impunity and that a robust and effective model of state 
cooperation is needed to facilitate mutual legal assistance and extradition. The 
Initiative was therefore envisaged as a means of rapidly operationalising an effective, 
inter-state cooperation regime relating to genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
 
156 The original core group consisted of Belgium, the Netherlands and Slovenia, later expanding to 
include Argentina, Mongolia and Senegal. See Declaration on International Initiative for Opening 
Negotiations on a Multilateral Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition in Domestic 
Prosecution of Atrocity Crimes (crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) (on file 
with author). 




crimes.158 Since its initial conception, the Initiative has attracted the support of over 
60 states. 159   In December 2018, a 66 article draft Convention on International 
Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes (the MLA Treaty) was finalised.160 It covers not 
only mutual legal assistance161 and extradition,162 but definitions of core crimes,163 
protection of sovereignty, 164  criminalization in domestic law, 165  establishment of 
jurisdiction,166 preliminary inquiry,167 liability of legal persons,168 transfer of persons 
sentenced,169 and issues surrounding experts and witnesses.170  As in the ILC Draft 
Articles, the aut dedere aut judicare,171 obligation is a key component of the MLA 
Treaty. Of note is that unlike in the ILC draft Articles, the aut dedere aut judicare 
 
158 Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Advisory Report on the ILC Draft 
Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, The Hague, August 2018, 1-2. 
159 ILC Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity – Comments and Observations of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, para 9.  
160 Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, annexed to ILC Draft Articles on Crimes 
Against Humanity – Comments and Observations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  
161 Articles 15-30. 
162 Articles 31-41.  
163 Article 2.  
164 Article 3.  
165 Article 4.  
166 Article 5. 
167 Article 6.  
168 Article 8. 
169 Articles 42-55. 
170 Articles 56-57. 
171 Article 7. 
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obligation is not discharged under the MLA Treaty by surrendering an alleged 
offender to an international criminal tribunal, something which seems a peculiar 
omission given the central role that international courts have played in the prosecution 
of such crimes to date.  
 
From a cooperation perspective, the MLA Treaty initially appears significantly more 
detailed than the ILC draft Articles. On extradition, it includes provisions on 
conditional extradition, provisional arrest, and transit, which are not included in the 
ILC Convention. It also contains more detail on the formalities and procedures of 
requests, presumably because while the ILC Convention assumes reliance on existing 
arrangements between states, the MLA Treaty works on the basis that states parties 
will use the Convention as the basis for judicial cooperation. A number of mandatory 
grounds for refusal are included, which is not the case in the ILC Convention, and 
states must refuse assistance where there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on 
account of sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that 
compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any 
one of these reasons; where there is a possibility of imposition of the death penalty; 
where the requested state has already made a final judgment against the sought person 
in relation to the facts for which extradition is sought; and where there is a possibility 
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment in the 
requesting state.172 The third ground, under which extradition must be refused where 
final judgment has been rendered, again raises questions on the status of national 
amnesty schemes and other non- or quasi- judicial post-conflict mechanisms. In 
 
172 Article 33.  
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particular, it is unclear whether states that have decided to pursue non-prosecutorial 
avenues might be able to legitimately refuse extradition on the ground that, for 
example, a grant of amnesty, is considered the ‘final judgment’ in a particular case at 
the national level. The language of ‘final judgment’ taken with the MLA Treaty’s 
object and purpose of strengthening the prospects for prosecution, might suggest the 
need for formal legal proceedings to have taken place. Nevertheless, the wording is 
vague and open to interpretation.173  
 
More surprising is that Art 52 of the MLA Treaty permits states, apparently without 
qualification, to grant pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence to sentenced 
persons who have been transferred to serve the sentence imposed. This seems startling 
given the prohibition under customary law of amnesty for international crimes.174 
Much of Part V of the MLA Treaty is borrowed from the 1983 Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which aims to facilitate transfer of foreign nationals in 
ordinary criminal cases, rather than in cases involving international crimes. The 
inclusion of this provision perhaps speaks to the dangers of ‘over-borrowing’ from 
familiar but different legal regimes, something that seems to have hindered both the 
ILC and group of core states in their efforts to create regimes that might truly enhance 
judicial cooperation in this area.  
 
Like the ILC Draft Convention, it seems probable that the MLA Treaty regime will 
struggle with practical obstacles around immunities. Unlike the ILC Draft 
Convention, however, the drafters of the MLA Treaty have not seen fit to include 
 
173 On these issues see Bisset, supra note 144, pp.178-182. 
174 OHCHR, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, New York and Geneva, 2009. 
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provisions either on the impact of official position upon criminal responsibility or on 
the status of immunities. Given the connection between immunity and cooperation 
and the potential impact of the law on immunity upon the effectiveness of any new 
treaty, its omission seems like an oversight. 
 
In essence, however, as the table below illustrates, the extradition provisions of the 




On mutual legal assistance, the MLA Treaty includes provisions on confiscation,175 
proceeds of crime,176 joint investigations177 and special investigative techniques,178 
which the ILC Convention does not contain. It lists twelve types of assistance for 
which requests can be made, in comparison with the ILC’s ten, including additionally 
recovery of assets,179  establishment of joint investigation teams180  and the use of 
special investigative techniques181 The ILC includes the identification and locations 
of alleged offenders, victims and witnesses, which the MLA Treaty does not. 182 In 
practical terms there is little difference as both Conventions permit the seeking of any 
 
175 Article 21. 
176 Article 22.  
177 Article 29. 
178 Article 30. 
179 Article 16(k). 
180 Article 16(h). 
181 Article 16(g). 
182 Article 14(3)(a). 
45 
 
type of assistance not listed that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested 
state.183 Procedures for making requests are also comparable184 
 
Although, on the face of it, the MLA Treaty appears to deal in more depth with 
judicial assistance, the key difference is really that it situates the detail on MLA 
within the Convention itself, while the ILC’s more detailed provisions are contained 
within an annex to the main Convention and only applicable where states do not have 
an existing agreement in place or choose to use the annex. The table below again 




Overall, the nature and tone of the draft Conventions are largely the same on mutual 
legal assistance, as the MLA Treaty also borrows heavily from UNTOC and UNCAC. 
There is therefore little to contrast. The result is that many of the frustrating aspects of 
the ILC Convention are mirrored in that of the core group of states. Like the ILC, the 
MLA Treaty requires the designation of a central authority for the issuing and 
receiving of requests,185 but it too leaves the possibility of reliance upon diplomatic 
channels,186 rather than taking the opportunity to curtail the potential for politicization 
of requests for assistance. It retains the traditional grounds for refusal of assistance,187 
despite the fact, as discussed above, that retention of those grounds may significantly 
 
183 Article 16(l); ILC Draft Articles , Article 14(3)(j). 
184 Article 17; ILC Draft Articles, Annex, paras 3 and 4.  
185 Articles 12 and 13.  
186 Article 13(2).  
187 Article 19.  
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impact the effectiveness of inter-state cooperation, as they have in the past. Questions 
around the impact of amnesty laws and the status of non-judicial investigatory 
mechanisms vis-à-vis requests for cooperation remain unsettled. Like the ILC Draft 
Convention, the MLA Treaty permits postponement of assistance where it would 
interfere with an ongoing investigation188 but offers no clarification of what might 
constitute an ‘investigation’ and whether it must be linked to formal legal proceedings 
for the purposes of postponement. 
 
Judicial cooperation is not the only area in which the MLA Treaty overlaps the 
content of the ILC Convention, a matter that appears to have caused a deal of 
consternation at the ILC. 189   Indeed, the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur 
contains a table illustrating the significant overlap between the two.190  The ILC has 
made the – not unreasonable - point that while some issues considered by the ILC are 
not considered by the core group of states, and vice versa, the only real difference is 
that the ILC considers only crimes against humanity, whereas the MLA Treaty 
additionally includes genocide and war crimes.191  It is not difficult to see why the 
ILC should be concerned by what essentially amounts to a duplication of Conventions 
aimed at prosecuting core crimes. What is difficult to understand is why the two 
bodies continued with two distinct projects which cover much of the same material 
but which, if adopted, would create two different legal regimes on some of the same 
issues. The ILC seems to point the finger of blame for this towards the core group of 
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189 ILC Fourth Report, supra note 101, paras 323-331.  
190 Ibid, 124-5. 
191 Ibid, para. 330. 
47 
 
states.192 Yet, it is the ILC’s narrow focus and failure to appreciate and acknowledge 
the wholly inadequate arrangements around genocide and war crimes that have led 
directly to this situation. It remains something of a mystery as to why the ILC decided 
to focus solely on crimes against humanity when, in practice, the impediments to 
justice created by existing cooperation arrangements apply equally to genocide and 
war crimes.  
 
 
5 The Way Forward 
 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that crimes against humanity should be the subject matter of 
a distinct convention in the same way as genocide and war crimes. This has been 
argued, convincingly, over many years.193 However, new, focused and robust inter-
state cooperation arrangements are needed for all core crimes if national courts are to 
assume the front line role that they ought to occupy in the consistent and effective 
prosecution of international crimes. Neither the ILC Convention nor the MLA Treaty 
achieves this. There is nothing revolutionary or even evolutionary on cooperation 
within these Conventions; they simply replicate existing provisions and therefore the 
existing problems around politicization and the ability to thwart cooperation through 
the exploitation of vague grounds for refusing assistance. Neither body appears to 
have heeded the warning that simply transposing existing regimes that were not 
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193 Leila Nadya Sadat, (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, (Cambridge 
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created to address the specific context and nature of crimes against humanity may 
prove ineffective.194  
 
The ILC leaves the issues around inter-state cooperation on genocide and war crimes 
entirely unaddressed. The MLA Treaty is an improvement on the ILC Convention in 
that it addresses all three core crimes and attempts at least to consolidate a 
cooperation regime that pertains to all three. However, neither has truly tackled nor 
rectified the fundamental problems of potential politicization and legally permitted 
loopholes within current cooperation regimes. Those gaps remain unplugged.  
 
Beyond the missed opportunities on judicial cooperation, there are some pressing and 
difficult issues on practicalities. The MLA treaty has no clear mechanism in place for 
state ratification. It was initially introduced via the ICC Assembly of States Parties, a 
factor that may diminish its attractiveness among some states. It was not deemed 
appropriate for the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) 
of the UNODC, as many states considered that this initiative did not fall within the 
CCPCJ’s mandate.195 It is not therefore clear how and via which route states might 
commit to the MLA Treaty.  
 
In contrast, the ILC Convention may soon be open for ratification and seems likely to 
be ratified by a large number of states. It has the advantages of having been concluded 
under the auspices of the ILC, with involvement of all states, something that the MLA 
 
194 Statement at the UN GA 6th Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/72/SR.18, 23 October 2017.  
195 CCPCJ, International cooperation in the fight against the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (E/CN.15/2013/L.5), para. 1. 
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Treaty cannot claim. However, it cannot be considered either desirable or sensible to 
open the ILC Convention for ratification without first giving proper consideration to 
the likely consequences of overlapping treaties on crimes against humanity. Both 
entities have been well aware of the work of the other. Yet in approaches that can 
only be considered woefully blinkered, neither appears to have undertaken 
meaningful analysis of what the existence of two treaties on crimes against humanity 
might mean for states parties in practice. Vague statements on ‘mutual reinforcement’ 
and the desire that neither adversely affect the other have emerged from various 
members of the group of core states.196 It is, however, the ILC Special Rapporteur’s 
assessment that two treaties are likely to be “inefficient… confusing and risk[s] the 
possibility that neither succeeds”197 that seems to capture the most likely outcome of 
two separate instruments.198 The Special Rapporteur’s 2019 report passes decision 
making on how to proceed to states. Thus, the opportunity to create a modern, 
innovative legal regime for all three core crimes that focuses on their unique nature 
and removes the legal inventions that have long enabled states to avoid cooperation 
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